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RECENT DECISIONS
have been had all assertible deductions been claimed in the federal
estate tax return. The court also held that the formula clause did
not fall within Section 125 of the Decedent's Estate Law.2 2  The
court gave as its reasons that the testator was obviously tax conscious
and aware of the great distinction between the adjusted gross estate
as defined by the Code and the net estate after paying administration
expenses. "The direction in the will must be given the operative
effect which the testator intended and that is that the marital trust
be fixed in an amount equal to one-half the adjusted gross estate
determined for tax purposes." 23
Thus Levy has apparently been overruled. But in the instant
case, where the will bequeathed to the widow a fund equal to one-
half of the entire value of the adjusted gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes, and also provided that all values should be as finally
determined for estate tax purposes, Surrogate DiFalco distinguished
the Levy case by holding that the formula clause before him more
specifically provided for the determination of values than the clause
in Levy. He then proceeded to sustain the widow's increased be-
quest, but directed that the residuary should be reimbursed out of
income to the extent that the estate taxes were increased by the
election.
Inman and the instant case fairly well establish that the surviv-
ing spouse's bequest will be allowed to stand at the amount deter-
mined by the adjusted gross estate figure on the federal estate tax
return, where the formula clause specifically so provides, even if the
option allowed by 64 2 (g) of the Code is exercised. The residuary
estate will then be reimbursed out of income to the extent that it
was depleted by the increased estate taxes. It is submitted that, even
if, as in the case of Levy, the testator's intention to take advantage of
the maximum marital deduction is only inferred, Inman and the in-
stant case indicate that the surviving spouse's bequest will be allowed
to stand at the amount determined by the adjusted gross estate figure
on the federal estate tax return.
EVIDENCE - WIRETAPPING- INJUNCTION AGAINST USE OF
WIRETAP EVIDENCE IN STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DENIED.-
Petitioner, indicted by a New York grand jury, brought an action in
22 The attempted grant to an executor of the power to make a binding and
conclusive fixation of the value of any asset for purposes of distribution or
allocation or otherwise is against public policy. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW § 125.
23 In re Inman, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369, 372 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
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a United States District Court against the District Attorney of Bronx
County and the Police Commissioner of New York City for a perma-
nent injunction restraining the defendants and their agents from using
certain wiretap evidence in petitioner's forthcoming trial. Defend-
ants, or their agents, having procured an order of the Supreme Court
of New York County permitting them to do so, tapped petitioner's
telephone and divulged the contents of the wiretaps to the grand jury,
the press, and others. The District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York denied petitioner's motion for a preliminary in-
junction and dismissed the complaint. Upon plaintiff's motion for
a stay pending hearing of his appeal, a divided Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the motion should be granted and an
order entered to enjoin the defendants from using and disclosing the
wiretap evidence at petitioner's trial pending hearing and determina-
tion of petitioner's appeal. Upon the hearing of petitioner's appeal.
the stay previously granted was vacated and it was held, again by a
divided Second Circuit, that a federal court should not enjoin state
agents from divulging wiretap evidence in state criminal trials.
Nevertheless, the Court subsequently reinstated the stay in the same
language pending application by petitioner to the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari and final action thereon. Upon the
granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court, petitioner made a mo-
tion for a modification of the stay, and it was held by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that it had power to grant the relief
sought, notwithstanding the grant of certiorari, and that the stay
enjoined the use of testimony obtained as a result of wiretapping as
well as the intercepted communications themselves. Pugach v'.
Dollinger, 180 F. Supp. 66, 275 F.2d 503, 277 F.2d 739, 280 F.2d
521 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 836 (1960).
The problem of wiretapping first arose in the early part of the
twentieth century with the invention of electronic and mechanical
listening devices.' The conflicting interests of the individual's right
to be free from wiretap surveillance and society's need for effective
criminal detection were early sought to be adjusted by state action.
By 1928 more than twenty states had passed laws making wiretap-
ping an offense.2 In Ohnstead v. United States 3 the question was
presented whether wiretapping was constitutional, in view of the
prohibition of the fourth amendment 4 against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Court there held that wiretapping was constitu-
'Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative
Proposal, 52 COLUM. L. Rzv. 165 (1952).
2 Id. at 173 n.40.
3277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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tional, and consequently, that evidence secured thereby was admis-
sible in federal courts.
Weeks v. United States,' decided in 1914, laid the foundation
for the federal courts' policy of excluding wiretap evidence. In that
case the rule was set forth that evidence secured in violation of the
fourth amendment is inadmissible in federal courts. 6 The ruling was
not strictly required by the fourth amendment, nor was it based on
a congressional policy favoring the inadmissibility of illegally seized
evidence.7 Rather, it was a matter of judicial implication from which
a rule of evidence, designed to deter unreasonable searches, emerged. s
The later case of Wolf v. Colorado 9 held that the Weeks doctrine
was not necessarily imposed on state courts by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court indicated that:
[GI ranting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way
of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this court to condemn as
falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a
State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be
equally effective. 0
In 1934, in response to public protests against the use of wire-
tapping," Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act.'2
Section 605 of that act forbids any person to intercept and divulge
a telephonic communication. This act was not intended to change
the existing law on the admissibility of wiretap evidence in federal
trials.'
3
Until Nardone v. United States14 was decided in 1937, there
was no direct prohibition on the use of wiretap evidence. In this
landmark case, the United States Supreme Court, apparently con-
vinced of the desirability of legislation making wiretap evidence in-
admissible in federal trials (implicitly recommended in the Ohnstead
case),' 5 proceeded to judicially enact such legislation. This was
5232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 Ibid.
7 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).8 Ibid.
9 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'oId. at 31.
"Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: Ain Analysis and a Legislative
Proposal, 52 CoLUm. L. REv. 165, 174 (1952).
1248 Stat 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). Section 605 states in
part: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person ...."
'3 The managers of the bill repeatedly declared that it was designed solely
to transfer jurisdiction over radio, telegraph, and telephone to an agency, the
Federal Communications Commission, and that "the bill as a whole does not
change existing law." Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis
and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 165 (1952).
24302 U.S. 379 (1937).
IS 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
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done by construing section 605 as prohibiting the admissibility of
wiretap evidence in federal prosecutions, despite the absence of such
a provision in the section.
The related problem of the admissibility of wiretap evidence in
state courts was considered in Schwartz v. Texas.16 The Court there
held that section 605, which had been construed to render intercepted
communications inadmissible in federal courts, did not compel the
exclusion of intercepted communications from evidence in the crim-
inal proceedings of state courts. The long-disputed section was con-
sidered by the Court as not having been intended to change state
rules of evidence.' 7  The rationale of the decision was that the en-
forcement of the statutory prohibitions of section 605 did not neces-
sitate making evidence obtained in violation thereof inadmissible,
for the section could be adequately enforced by the penal provisions
of section 501 of the act.' 8
The oft-cited decision of Benanti v. United States'0 added to
the confusion surrounding the already perplexing problem of the
effect of section 605 on the admissibility of wiretap evidence in fed-
eral and state courts. The holding of that case was to the effect that
evidence obtained by means forbidden by section 605, whether by
state or federal officers, is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial.20
The Court also indicated in dictum that in view of the plain terms
of the section, Congress did not intend to let stand state legislation
permitting wiretapping contrary to section 605 and the public policy
upon which it was based.21 This statement created grave doubts as
to the status of state laws permitting wiretap surveillance pursuant
to court order. Thus, for example, Justice Hofstadter of the New
York Supreme Court, relying on the Benanti decision, has indicated
that wiretap orders pursuant to Section 813-a of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure 22 may no longer be lawfully issued.23  Wiretap evi-
16344 U.S. 199 (1952).
17 Id. at 203.
IS Id. at 201.
19355 U.S. 96 (1957).
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 105-06.
22 Section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure is the legal
justification for .wiretapping by law enforcement officials in New York today.
The section provides for the issuance of an ex parte order for the interception
of telephone and telegraph communications by a judge of a designated court
upon the oath or affirmation of qualified law enforcement officials that "there
is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be obtained." The
order may not be issued indiscriminately. The applicant must particularly
identify the telephone, the persons whose messages are to be intercepted, and
the purpose of the interception. The judge may also examine the applicant
and his witnesses to see whether in fact there is reasonable ground for ex-
pecting to uncover evidence of crime. N.Y. CODE CRM. PROC. § 813-a.
23 Matter of Interception of Telephone Communications, 9 Misc.2d 121,
170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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dence, however, still may be obtained pursuant to court order in
New York today, and it is admissible according to New York
decisions.
24
In Stefanelli v. Minard 25 an injunction was sought to restrain
the admission in a New Jersey criminal proceeding of evidence seized
by state police officers who entered into petitioners' homes without
lawful authority. In denying the request for injunctive relief, the
United States Supreme Court indicated that federal courts should
not intervene in state criminal trials even to enjoin the use of evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search. The Court also indicated that
equity should refuse to exercise its discretionary power save in ex-
ceptional cases. As defined by the Court such exceptional cases
would involve situations in which irreparable injury to defendant
would otherwise result.
The first decision of the United States Court of Appeals in the
instant case,26 which granted the stay and enjoined the use of wiretap
evidence pending appeal, created grave doubts as to the admissibility
of wiretap evidence in state courts. These doubts apparently were
dispelled upon the determination of the appeal,27 where it was held
that a federal court should not enjoin state agents from divulging
wiretap evidence in state criminal trials, notwithstanding that such
divulgence would constitute a federal crime. The instant case, how-
ever, will soon be passed on by the United States Supreme Court,
which has granted certiorari.28 If the reasoning of the first decision
of the Court of Appeals is adhered to by the Supreme Court, the
effect of the Pugach case would be, in certain instances, to effectively
prevent the introduction in state criminal trials of evidence secured
in contravention of section 605.
A comparison of the Court of Appeals' decisions in the principal
case tends to support the logic of its second decision refusing to en-
join state agents from divulging wiretap evidence in criminal trials.
The first decision, proceeding on the theory that federal courts
should not "sit idly by" and countenance violations of federal law by
state agents or officials, concludes that federal courts should intervene
where such intervention will prevent a further violation of section
605, riz., the divulgence of the wiretaps, and non-intervention would
result in irreparable injury to the petitioner.29 Underlying this posi-
24 People v. Grant, 14 Misc.2d 182, 179 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1958);
see Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1960).
25 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
26 Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
27 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960).
28363 U.S. 836 (1960).
29 The irreparable injury alleged by petitioner in the instant case was that
if the evidence were received at the trial and he were convicted, he would be
wholly without remedy; for under Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952),
the evidence is admissible under the New York rules of evidence even though
illegally obtained, and his conviction would not be reversed.
19601
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tion, no doubt, was the Court's view that a criminal prosecution
and/or a civil suit against the enforcement officers who violated the
law were hopelessly inadequate remedies.30
The second decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dis-
trict court's denial of permanent injunctive relief, takes a different
approach. In this decision the Court underscores the independence
of the state court systems from the federal courts. Decrying the
granting of injunctive relief in the instant case as unnecessary inter-
ference on the part of the federal courts in the states' administration
of their criminal law and with crimes solely within the states' power
to prosecute, the Court points out that the exercise of the power to
grant equitable relief is a matter of discretion, and that, under the
circumstances of the instant case, the balance weighs against the
granting of such relief.31 The Court indicates its reluctance to over-
look the long recognized principle of equity that a court should not
enjoin the commission of a crime because this would make serious
inroads on the public policy of preserving the right to jury trial.
That the divulgence of the evidence sought to be enjoined would
constitute the commission of a federal crime was not regarded as
significant, for the Court felt that the plaintiff must prevail, if at all,
by vindication of his own rights under section 605, not by collateral
enforcement of the rights of the United States. In this way the
Court dismissed the petitioner's contention that the present case was
to be distinguished from the Stefanelli case on the ground that in
Stefanelli the violation of federal law had already taken place. The
Court regarded the Stefanelli case as "the expression of a general
policy against 'piecemeal' intervention by the federal courts in state
proceedings for the purpose of litigating collateral issues." 32
The logic of the latter decision of the Court of Appeals is clear.
The rule that evidence obtained by unreasonable search or seizure,
i.e., illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible, emerged by a process
of judicial implication.33 The Weeks case merely represented a
policy decision--one in which the Supreme Court announced a rule
of evidence that would thereafter bind federal courts.3 4  However,
as the case of Wolf v. Colorado points out, the rule was to bind
federal courts only, not state courts.3 5
The Nardone decision superimposed another judicial implication
on the foundation laid by the Weeks case. Section 605 makes no
mention of the admissibility of evidence obtained by wiretapping.
Nor can any sound process of statutory construction justify the
interpretation that Congress intended to make wiretap evidence in-
30 Pugach v. Dollinger, supra note 26, at 506.
3' Pugach v. Dollinger, supra note 27, at 742.
3 2Id. at 743.
33 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).34 Ibid.
35 Id. at 33.
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admissible, for the word "divulge" in the section has not been inter-
preted as referring to admissibility. Nevertheless it is certainly
within the province of the Supreme Court's duties to formulate rules
of evidence for the federal court system; the Court has "from the
very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be ap-
plied in federal criminal prosecutions," 36 and viewed in this light,
the Nardone case is more easily supportable.
However, as was pointed out in Schwartz v. Texas, section 605
was not intended to change state rules of evidence. The first Court
of Appeals decision in the instant case would have that effect in cer-
tain instances.3 7 That decision may be viewed as an extension of the
previous extensions outlined above. It is submitted that perhaps the
breaking point has been reached.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - VENUE - REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY
FOR TRANSFER UNDER SECTION 1404(a) OF THE JUDICIAL CODE.-
In two cases 1 before the Supreme Court respondents (plaintiffs)
served process and brought actions in federal district courts having
jurisdiction and proper venue over the adverse parties. The adverse
parties (defendants), showing "convenience" and "interests of
justice," moved for transfer under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial
Code.2 They admitted that the proposed transferee forums did not
originally have venue, but claimed that the clause "where [the action]
might have been brought" should not apply solely to the time of the
bringing of the action, but also to any subsequent time, when, by
their waiver of lack of venue, the proposed transferee forum would
be one where the action "might then have been brought." Petitioners,
both district court judges, granted the motions for transfer, but the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,3 in mandamus proceedings,
36 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
%7 These instances would be where federal court intervention would prevent
the further violation of § 605, as by the divulgence of the wiretaps, and non-
intervention would result in irreparable injury to petitioner. See Pugach v.
Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1960).
'Hoffman v. Blaski, Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) (The
cases, numbered 25 and 26 respectively, were treated in one opinion by the
majority of the Court, but Justice Frankfurter wrote separate dissenting
opinions.).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958). The section reads: "For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.'
3 In the Hoffman case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
already determined that § 1404(a) applied. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737
1960]
